LANGUAGE, LINGUISTICS AND LINGUISTS;
A PANEL DISCUSSION WITH:

Michael GREGORY
M.A.K. HALLIDAY
Walter H. HIRTL
Sydney M. LAMB
David G. LOCKWOOD
André MARTINET
Jan W.F. MULDER
Kenneth L. PIKE

presented by:

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PRÉSENTATION

Au mois d'août 1983, deux colloques internationaux ont eu lieu simultanément à l'Université Laval: le 10e Colloque annuel de la Société Internationale de Linguistique Fonctionnelle (SILF) et le Tenth LACUS Forum (Linguistic Association of Canada and United States).

C'était l'occasion idéale pour réunir des représentants de théories linguistiques différentes et de les faire discuter entre eux. La rencontre qui a eu lieu -- et qu'on a appelé par la suite la "Rencontre de Québec" -- a été volontairement improvisée; elle ne figurait pas dans le programme du colloque conjoint. Aucun des participants n'avait de texte préparé à l'avance, car le but poursuivi était de provoquer une discussion spontanée.

Étant donné l'importance des termes "grammaire" et "syntaxe" en linguistique contemporaine et les acceptations fort différentes liées à ces deux termes, c'est sur cette dichotomie que devait porter le débat. En fait, ce thème initial a servi d'amorce à une discussion d'ordre plus général et plus fondamental. Très spontanément, en effet, le débat s'est orienté vers le point de vue adopté par chaque théorie, de sorte que les aspects épistémologiques et le rapport abstraction-description ont pris de plus en plus d'importance. En fin de compte, ce débat a permis d'établir très clairement des différences, mais aussi certains consensus. Et c'est ce qui en fait toute la valeur.

Il est rare qu'on puisse faire discuter ensemble plusieurs représentants -- sinon fondateurs -- de théories différentes. De plus, ce que certains participants craignaient ne s'est pas produit: il n'y a pas eu de confrontation qui aurait engendré un débat stérile. Bien au contraire, il y a eu un échange fructueux et qui a paru exemplaire aux organisateurs de cette rencontre. Exemplaire de par l'attitude de chacun, empaire de par le contenu, exemplaire de par le choc des idées scientifiques. Nous avons pensé que le débat du 10 août 1983 méritait publication -- publication qui n'avait pas été envisagée à l'origine.
In your theory, what is syntax and what is grammar? Do you make a difference between them? I would like that every one of you first give his definition within his theory.

I'm Ken Pike. I use syntax and grammar in a more or less classical, Bloomfieldian way, with syntax in contrast to morphology, above the word, and with grammar representing morphology and syntax. Those terms are pretty well-known. However, I use semantics as being meaning and meaning being impact from the speaker on the hearer or of the intent of the speaker or the understanding of the
hearer, so that I have three kinds of hierarchies: phonological, grammatical and referential. But in each of those there's structure, and substantial structure, and each of those has meaning, because they have impact. Voice quality, for example, would have impact, intonation would have impact, and rhyme in poetry has impact. The grammar also would have hierarchy at each level and the grammar would go from the morpheme structure, through word structure, up to the structure of sentences, up the monologues, discourse, conversation, and all kind of texts and interlocking discussions with people. There would be meaning at those levels too and the meaning would be the generalized impact; for example, on the clause level, there could be actor or under-goer as subject, or patient as subject. On the sentence level, it could be cause an effect; on a discourse level, it could be various kinds of pragmatic material. On the referential hierarchy, there would also be semantics, and there would also be structure - hierarchical - but it would not be sequential, whereas the grammatical material would be sequential, and the referential structure would cover the encyclopedic knowledge of mankind which is background to speech.

Sydney M. Lamb:

I'm Sydney Lamb. Like Ken Pike, we can use the terms syntax and grammar in the manner of the Bloomfieldian tradition, but in this case, we're not using them as technical terms. In fact, we usually do not use the term "syntax" as a technical term, because we have followed Hockett, who proposed that, since it seems that there are separate syntaxes at separate strata of the linguistic structure, we need a more general term. He proposed the
term "tactics", and that's the one that we use. And we recognize three structural strata, or some branches of our school recognize four, and it has been characteristic of all of our branches that every stratum has its own tactics. And so, on the phonological stratum there is a phonotactics, on the morphological there is a morphotactics, and so forth. Now the phonotactics defines the structures of syllables, phonological words, phonological phrases, and larger units. As for the morphotactics, it depends on which version of the theory we are using. In the newer version which I'm proposing, the lexical-grammatical stratum covers both surface and deep grammar. The tactics, which would include within it alternations, in the new view, defines or specifies units all the way from morphemes up to words, phrases, clauses, sentences and even larger units. In the syntax or tactics of the conceptual stratum, the highest one that we recognize, we are dealing with thing like knowledge. We attempt to look at the typical person's cognitive system. And so the syntax at this level would include not only the general, or encyclopedic, knowledge that the typical person might have, it would also include the knowledge that that person has or her own personal history, all of the people and places and things that the person knows and how they are inter-related to one another. That is a quick summary.

Michael Gregory:

Well now I'm using the term grammar to describe that statement we make when we look at language as a code and distinguish between language as activity and language as the codal resources for that activity. The moment I use the term grammar, I use it for the three codal strata: semology, morpho-
syntax, and phonology. Morphosyntax now is where I make the type of statement which many people would think of as the surface grammar. They are the lexical units of the language and their arrangement in words, groups, clauses, sentences. And semology handles some of the things some people call deep grammar like process types and roles associated with them, circumstantialis, etc. It also operates, as does the other two strata, with a rank scale of units. Morphosyntax, for example, handles sentence, clause, group, word, and morpheme and in the semology operating at the moment, there is proposition, predication, concept, and insofar as discourse can be codified, discourse statements could move over into the semology. When I'm looking at language as activity, I recognize three planes of experience: situation, in which encoder selects the message and to which decoder has resource to in order to interpret the message, and the discourse in a realization of the message in activity, which is manifested. So the three planes of experience in activity are situation, discourse and manifestation. The link between the activity part of language and the code is seen that if the message is to be conveyed by linguistic discourse, the code is activated, semology realized by morphosyntax, realized by phonology, which produces a manifestation in the activity. This manifestation is recognized by user and receiver as constituting discourse.

M.A.K. Halliday:

I'm Michael Halliday. I work in what is called usually systemic linguistics, which itself is a development from the system-structure theory of J.R. Firth, which in turn is part of the mainstream of European post-Saussurean linguistics and has strong links with the Prague School, with Hjelmslev.
in Copenhagen and other European groups, and in the
United States most strongly with the American
anthropological linguists, Sapir and Whorf. The
main outline is very much the same as what we've had
from Ken Pike, Syd Lamb and Michael Gregory in terms
of essentially a three-level, or shall we say tri-
stratal model, because "level" got confused with
level in the sense of "rank". So let's say a three-
stratum model. The terminology that I use is
perhaps a little more traditional than we've heard
from the last two speakers in that the central
stratum - you can look at these tri-stratal models,
as having a purely abstract level in the center and
then two outer strata as inter-faces between this
central abstract code and extra-linguistic phenomena
- this central level is refered to as lexicogrammar.
This is essentially the grammar in the traditional
sense; I like to put the word "lexico-" in front of
it to make it clear that the vocabulary, or lexicon,
is in fact part of this - it's an abstraction at the
same level. So within lexico-grammar, one can
distinguish grammar and lexicon (although there is
no line between these: for me lexicon is simply the
most delicate end of the grammar).

I don't find it necessary to use the term
"syntax" very much, although I would recognize it in
exactly the sense that Ken Pike just said: the
traditional division of grammar into syntax and
morphology, with the line being drawn at the rank of
the word. However, since there are many languages
around the world that don't have any morphology,
this is clearly a universal feature and, as I
say, I don't find it necessary to use these terms.

Just two more points about this. One has
to arrange the strata, so to speak, in at least two
topological orientations; the other one is the
Hjelmslevian one, with its major boundary between content and expression, in which case, of course, both the grammar and the stratum "above" it - that is, what we call semantics - would be on the content plane. So you would have semantics and then lexico-grammar on the content plane, and phonology on the expression plane. The only other point I would make is that, by contrast with what Michael Gregory said, as I organize statements about language both the system and the process (the text, if you like) are encompassed within the single hierarchy of levels. In other words, I don't set up a separate set of levels for the text, or for behaviour, as he called it, but rather think of each as encompassing both system and process, as Hjelmslev said - that is, system and text, where text is both product and process.

Walter H. Hirtle:

I'm here to represent a Guillaumian approach to the study of language. Perhaps the best way to begin is that we would understand the study of grammar as the study of a meaning-system. That is to say, in the traditional sense, grammar is made up of morphology and syntax, but since grammar for us is originally the study of what we would call grammatical meanings, or formal significates, as opposed to lexical, or material significates, we feel that within the word, the morphology of a word provides us with certain grammatical meanings that the word itself carries, regardless of how it will be situated in the sentence. And so our first moment - we speak of moments rather than levels, because we see things as processes - the first moment is to study the morphogenesis of a word: how a word is put together morphologically. The second moment, then, would be that of syntax, and I think
one of the most important distinctions for us is that the morphology of a word, the grammatical meaning that have been built into it, will determine, will condition how it can be used at the moment of syntax, in the phrase or in the sentence. A consequence of this is that we cannot have a theory of syntax until we understand, or have a theory of the morphology within a word. And so most efforts in our analyses so far have concentrated on providing a theory of the word, as a consequence of which we can now begin, in some areas, examining problems of syntax since, once again, syntactic relations on the level of the phrase or the sentence are the consequence of the grammatical meaning that has built into the word at the moment of morphogenesis. A final point on this: what I have said here concerns mainly Indo-European languages, because, as Mr. Halliday pointed out, there are various types of languages throughout the world, various ways of building words, and so, when I speak of morphology within the word, I'm thinking of the Indo-European languages. Some languages, of course, put their words or vocables together very differently from the way we do, and we would have to use the term "morphology" perhaps in a different way there.

Jan W.F. Mulder:

My theory has, in the first sentence, three sub-theories - deontology, systemology and semantics - which are autonomous but inter-related areas. Deontology because in a systemology, we speak about linguistic items; and so we do in the semantics: we need a sub-theory in which, pretty clearly, the nature of these items is indicated and that's deontology, which we call the signum theory. We don't call it the sign theory because symbols are as much in it as what we call linguistic.
signs in which there is a denotation. The system-
ology - that is, the place where we will find the
semantics - is defined at first in phonology and
grammar in a fairly traditional manner. Within
phonology, we make a distinction between phonem-
tics, in which we have, as it were, the highest
level in phonematics: that is the phoneme; the
second level is the phonotactics, in which we have
ordering relations between the phonemes (phonemes
can be put together with ordering relations). And
then we recognize a third level, which I call para-
phonotactics: I'm talking about phonotactics. If we
talk about a semiotic system in general, I would
call it synomastics, synotactics and para-synotac-
tics, but I shall refer to langue in the first
place. In the para-phonotactics we have certain
units get, as it were, a new form by having certain
features added to them, like tone in Chinese, for
instance, and things in English like the difference
between 'contrast' and 'contrast'. So
that's the para-phonotactics side. Parallel to
that, we have the grammar, which we could also call
the plerological system. We have the synological
system, or phonological system, and the plerological
system. Grammar is just another name for that.
Within that we have pleromastics, plerotactics and
para-plerotactics, but in order to be able to talk
with people from other schools of linguistics, we
call pleromastics morphology (in the American way,
actually) and we call plerotactics syntax (in the
American way). Now the difference between morpholo-
gy and syntax is, in practice, very near to what
Professor Pike said already: at the level of words.
But we define the thing: we don't use the term
"word" - we use the term "plereme" for the equiva-
 lent thing; in the case of, for instance, the
King's hat, we would recognize two pleremes,
whereas it almost looks as if King's were one word. On the other hand, if one has in German Sie geht die Treppe auf, geht auf would still be one unit. I think I'm nearer to the stratificationists in that respect. On the basis of there not being, functionaly speaking, ordering relations between the components, just as in phonology there are no - functionaly speaking - ordering relations between the components within a phoneme, we distinguish between morphology and syntax. In syntax we have the things together which are at least capable of standing in ordering relations with one another. Now the third level - and that is very important, because here we differ from most people - the third level, the para-syntactic level, or para-lerotactic level, in practice - not completely, but in practice almost - the sentential level is absolutely distinct from the syntactic level in our theory. I do not recognize a hierarchy throughout, from sentence, clause, syntagm, word, etc., etc., but the hierarchy, for instance in the l erotactics - that is, in the morphology - is plereme and moneme, in the sense that Martinet uses the term. In the syntax, or l erotactics, it is syntagm; of course a syntagm can itself be analyzed into syntagms: sometimes, it can be very complex (we have, of course, the terminology for dealing with all these things, but we would go too far to talk about that here). And ultimately we have pleremes (that's the lower level in the syntactic level); and then we have on the sentential level - the level of sentence - clause. Now clauses and sentences may correspond to syntagms, or they may not. If you have a thing like Voce un élève (that's perhaps a sentence), there is no syntactic relation between the two entities, and there we would have, for instance, a discrepancy, and you have often discrepancies in ordinary speech.
André Martinet:

André Martinet, Paris. I am looking at things in the framework of the double articulation, i.e. the distinction between the plane of distinctive units and the plane of significant units. That's basic, and very different from the two planes of expression and contents of Hjelmslev's glossematics. Now grammar: when we deal with grammar and syntax, the plane of distinctive units is not involved at all, and I'm not going to say anything about that. The analysis and presentation of what I call the first articulation that is the articulation of experience into minimal significant units which I call monemes - is traditionally presented in two different volumes, the grammar and the lexicon. I think we should stick to that, the reason being that in grammar we put everything which can exhaustively be described and presented. If, by any chance, we could manage to analyze meaning, the whole of the meaning of a language, into a limited number of meaningful features, we would be entitled to include meaningful features in the grammar and then we would, in the dictionary, present each item as made up of a number of units which we find in the grammar. But I don't expect we can ever do that and we are saddled with the necessity of having two books for the presentation of a language, the grammar and the lexicon. The first chapter of grammar is something which I would call the inventory, i.e., the determination of the number of classes in the language. The classes are determined, not on the basis of combinability, but on the basis of compatibility, which is very different. It's not a matter of being close to each other; compatibility implies the possibility for the monemes to co-exist meaningfully, in some specific relation. The position of
the different monemes in the sentence, is not necessarily relevant. The first chapter is thus the inventory based up on compatibilities, and compatibilities could be considered to be part of syntax. But usually the term "syntax" is reserved for something else. Once the compatibility-classes are established, the problem arises of how the hearer can from the linear succession of speech items reconstruct the experience which has been communicated by the speaker.

Syntax is just that: the study of what the hearer will have recourse to for reconstructing the experience presented by the speaker, broken down into a succession of monemes. Although we can include in syntax all the features which are involved in the determination of the classes, syntax, in a narrow sense, consists in pointing out the different relations that can exist between members of two different classes, such as verbs and nouns, in English, for instance. Such are for example, the subject-relationship, the object-relationship, or the dative relationship. In other terms the real task of syntax is to determine the different possibilities of connecting monemes corresponding to different classes. This, can be secured in three ways: 1. using specific monemes, which we call relationalss or functionals, such as conjunctions, prepositions or cases; 2. taking advantage of the order of items (but this being only one of the possibilities, and founding a syntactic typology on order only, with SVO, VOS, and so on, is preposterous, because, depending on language and position, order is relevant or not); 3. using monemes which by themselves indicate their relationship to the rest of the utterance: French *kier*, for example, is a moneme which, by itself, indicates its connection to the rest of the utterance: *kier* is not only
the day before today, but also that lapse of time in which some thing has taken place. We find languages where a word we could call a noun, *foræst*, for instance, is endowed with the possibility of indicating its function with no need to add a preposition or a case. The three possibilities can be combined as for instance in the expression of the object, in Spanish, by means of the preposition a (our possibility no 1); or it is suggested by its postposition to the verb (our possibility no 2); or, still, by the meaning of the word which is such that you cannot expect it to be an agent (our possibility no 3). The last chapter of grammar is what we call synthematics, namely the study of wordstem formation, which we consider part of grammar.

Conrad Bureau:

I think we have enough matter to... start the discussion! There seems to be some agreement, it has been said, on some points. This is not quite true, after what I heard. But before we get into that discussion, I'll ask Mr. Lockwood to give his point of view.

David G. Lockwood:

Well, I could make a couple of points. Just briefly, with regard to what Professor Lamb has already said about stratificational linguistics, I don't disagree with what he said -- a very basic but thorough presentation of the main points. But with regard to the terms, the main question about terminology, that the term "grammar", it's just of interest to note, that at one time he did use the term "grammar" in his *Outline of Stratificational Grammar*, which was at that time being contrasted...
to transformational grammar, and it's just of interest, in a terminological question to note that when I wrote my Introduction to Stratificational Linguistics, I used the term "grammatical phenomena" for covering what he's now calling the lexical-grammatical.

M. Gregory:

I would like to clarify a point with Michael Halliday. I would have to recognize that my work has stemmed from Michael Halliday's and I would consider my position to be within the systemic-functional school of linguistics - however, with influences from stratificational and tagmemic, and a change of concern, I think. Michael pointed out he only needs one set of strata and doesn't need planes of experience, because he sees system and process, if you like, as one and the same body of statements. And I would really agree that can be done: it's a position which is a very fruitful one. However, my concern is to develop a linguistics, which I'm calling communication linguistics, which is concerned with seeing language as a communication among other forms of communication between people. That's to some extent why I had to separate the system, or as I call it, the "grammar" (using it in the sense in which Sydney Lamb used it in his Outline of Stratificational Grammar, for the whole of the codal side) and the planes of experience, to deal with the process, and seeing language as one part of a set of communicative processes that we have, all of which have their own codes, or systems, behind them. And the other point that I'm trying to make is that because people have used the term syntax and morphology, I call my middle stratum (which is essentially the stratum which does the statements of the lexicon and its arrangements in
units) morpho-syntactic, which is, if you like, 'bits', and the way 'bits' go together. But, of course, that gets shortened to syntax, out of verbal laziness. I just wanted to clarify those points.

J.W.F. Mulder:

In the first place, I would like to add something about what Michael Halliday calls inter-levels. I regard a level of allophonic or allophony, and a level of allomorphy, where I describe the realizational parts. Coming to realizational, André Martinet said it would be ridiculous to recognize ordering. That depends very much on whether one means ordering in the sense of realizational ordering, that is, linear ordering - which I do not: when I talk about ordering relations, I'm talking about relations of asymmetry in a set theoretical sense. And that can be made as the basis, it's a very logical thing. There's another reason why it is not all that ridiculous (even if it were not to be found in every language): I believe that we have to distinguish between theory and description. In the theory, like Hjelmslev has said, you have to find all the things that have to be foreseen. For me, these are not things that one finds in languages but ways to describe languages. So a theory for me is an arbitrary instrument, arbitrary but appropriate, and the appropriateness guarantees that it is not hocus-pocus, as Householder would have said. It still remains that it's not God's truth either. I don't think that there is such a distinction. But that guarantees this. And therefore, in a theory, you can have very well some possibility - because it's only a possibility - for the description of a feature that in some languages you don't find, as long as you have all the possibilities - as long as any language can be described by such a theory.
K.L. Pike:

I'll take a very different view, just to have fun. Let's suppose that we say that there's no understanding unless there's pattern. To assume that I've understood there's something but have not seen anything that is pattern, I would say is hopelessly false. But then, what is pattern? Well, pattern is things put together. And how do you find that out? You find that out by studying. And what do you do when you study? You're describing it. And if we're going to understand pattern, we have to talk about that pattern - and that is theory, to some degree. Therefore, from my point of view, description leads to pattern, pattern, when stated, is a kind of theory. So I think it is very damaging that in this last generation, we've split description from theory the way we have done. Then I would say that description in this sense, if it's well done, is a variety of theory, because it's presenting pattern, which is a variety of theory.

J.W.F. Mulder:

Well I know that this is the inductivist point of view, which, of course, I do not share. I'm a hypothetico-deductivist of a kind. I believe it's also the point of view of the Firthian school - at least it was. But I always thought that Michael Halliday was a little bit more abstract than the orthodox Firthian point of view. In a sense, someone has said, this is a matter of faith. But I don't see that we cannot, by a proper hypothetico-deductive logic, come to an approaching reality, simply by requiring very strictly that the theory one sets up (which is not an account of reality, that's the description), is appropriate. I honestly
believe that this is a more humble point of view
that the point of view that one can actually, as a
human being, discover the truth and nothing but the
truth.

A. Martinet:

Am I mistaken if I understand the remark
made by Kenneth Pike as indicating, not that there
can be a theory at the back of a description, but
that a description by itself may be representative
of the theory which is at the back of it? In other
words, you can't deduct it from the description
itself what the theory is.

J.W.F. Mulder:

Yes that is the best of point of view.

A. Martinet:

I think the point of view which was
expressed, you see, indicated that with many of us,
I think, we would be ready to identify a theory
through a description. A good description of a
language might be indicative of the theory which is
at the back of it. There must be some sort of
theory at the back of any description. And there-
fore, why couldn't it be possible to deduct it, as
it were, from it?

J.W.F. Mulder:

I don't think so. Not from one descrip-
tion. And I don't think that Professor Pike would
indicate that one could get it from one description.
I believe that he, or Bloomfield, has written that
one comes by generalization from descriptions to
theory, in the end.
C. Bureau:

I think Mr. Pike did not mean pure description but, something different; anyway, it will come back. I think we should ask Mr. Hirtle now to give his opinion, and then Mr. Lamb.

W.H. Hirtle:

The relationship between description and theory, I think, might be looked at, if we go back to Saussure, with his notion of langue/parole - langue which I express in English as tongue, as in the mother tongue. From our point of view, if we attempt to describe tongue, with all the problems involved in wondering how we can describe something we can't possibly observe directly, but if we manage to come up with some sort of an approximative description of tongue, then to the extent that this corresponds to the reality of tongue, it will provide a theory of usage. From our point of view, then, if we talk about description as divorced from theory, we would have to see it as a description of usage, and this is certainly not a theory of usage, I would agree there. The description of sentences is not a theory of sentences; but if it is a description of la langue, of tongue - that which provides the system which permits us to create sentences - then to the extent that this description is valid, we have a theory of usage and therefore a theory of language. Now I realize that this is a very different point of view from those presented by the last two speakers.

S.M. Lamb:

I'm proposing to change the subject, so if Mr. Halliday wants to speak on the same subject, I would defer to him.
M.A.K. Halliday:

Not particularly; we could cover other ground. A brief comment, though, if you like. I don't really feel a great deal of distance here. I think I would agree with what Jan Mulder said: I would certainly take a position more or less following that of Firth, and Hjelmslev, who are not that far apart. But I think that if you look at linguists, practice, as distinct from what they say about theory, if you look at their actual practice there is really very little difference in the way that they actually go about their business. And it's interesting to describe what they do; but I don't think that it's particularly illuminated by discussions about the nature of the theory. I think that what, in fact, you do is you look at the work that somebody does, and you don't say, as a rule: one exception perhaps - you don't say: "He's gone about the theory the wrong way", you say: "I think his theory works well for what he is saying", or "It doesn't", or "I criticize it in this way". But the different accounts are all, at bottom, within the same universe of discourse. Perhaps the view most distant from what any of us here would hold would be that which maintains that language is a well-formed system that can be fully described by some kind of formal apparatus. I think none of us here, probably, would accept that view.

M. Gregory:

I'd just like to make it clear that I can't, myself, conceive of a description, which doesn't implicitly have a theory, of some sort, insofar as description is an organization, a generalizing organization of material. I also would take the Firthian position on the nature of theory: I'm
certainly not a "God's-truther". I like Jan Mulder's idea that theories are, at least to a measure, arbitrary, and the aim is to be appropriate. I would also like to add that I think this follows absolutely on what Michael Halliday said, that our theories tend to be appropriate to certain purposes and preoccupations that we have: what we want to say about language, and for what reasons we want to say things about language.

W.H. Hittle:

I simply wanted to comment on a remark made by Mr. Halliday when he said: "I don't think that anyone here would claim that language is a well-formed system". Language as a whole-no; grammar (since we started out discussing that) - in our view of grammar, is a well-formed system.

S.M. Lamb:

I noticed that when we went around the first time Michael Halliday was the only one who identified his historical origins. In the case of Walter Hittle, he made it obvious also. In the case of Mr. Mulder, it's quite obvious from what he said that he has a strong Hjelmslevian component, and I'd like to ask you since, a lot of us have been influenced by Hjelmslev, whether you have Hjelmslev more heavily concentrated in your theory than the rest of us?

J.W.F. Mulder:

In fact, I'm very much in agreement with the spirit of Hjelmslev. The practice of my theory is much more functionalist, after Martinet's dictum
that function is the criterion of linguistic reality; I'm looking for functional items. So I'm certainly very much influenced by the Prague School through the Troubetskoys' side and the Martines side. It's funny that it was only later on, when I had already written quite a bit, that I discovered that in many respects I was close to Hjelmslev. I discovered also, to my surprise, that there were certain things... I must have read it, but I didn't realize it... I had something very similar to the tagmemic idea, in a certain respect. The funny thing is I had even the word *syntagmeme* for something, but not in the same way as Pike has, which I discovered a bit later. I must have been influenced by all sorts of people. I got certainly very much interested in stratificational linguistics, which I taught with great pleasure, as you can see from certain on terminologies I use, as *morphom* or something like that. But it didn't affect the theory as much. I think the theory is definitely functionalist and not Hjelmslevian, but there is a great Hjelmslevian influence, which I didn't realize.

S.M. Lamb:

Could I ask another question? Could you characterize very briefly what is the major distinction between "Hjelmslevian" and "functionalist"?

A. Martinet:

Well, I see functionalism as fundamentally different. Although we derived from the same source, namely Saussure, we really diverged very soon on basic points. Hjelmslev, for instance, eliminated diachrony from his approach. He developed the notion of latency which makes it possible to
present the system of a modern language, like Russian, in the same terms as Common Slavic. It would seem that it all started from a suggestion of mine according to which, when describing the phonemic system of French we could posit a so-called mute phoneme, which made the presentation of facts much simpler. But, of course, there is no such thing as a in French. Later on, I backed out, while he jumped on it and developed that theory of latency, which makes it possible, as I said, to give the same description for a language at its various stages. We would practically have the same description for Old English, Middle English and Modern English, which would be great fun indeed. My reaction to Hjelmslev's teaching was just the same as his reaction to Prague's teaching. In other words, he got his inspiration from Prague and took totally different position. My own reaction to his teaching was the same. I was very much interested, definitely influenced by him, but negatively.

J.W.F. Mulder:

I'm in one respect, perhaps, closer to Hjelmslev than André Martinet is: than relation figures very strongly in my theory, and even though things are often expressed as if they are items, they are basically items because of relations.

A. Martinet:

May I mention the fact that the term "realism" which will probably characterize my standpoint as opposed to...

J.W.F. Mulder:

I don't agree, I think I'm more realistic.
A. Martinet:

Realism in some sense, it is of course a wonderful realism.

J.W.F. Mulder:

I go even deeper into reality than you do.

S.M. Lamb:

It seems that many people have been influenced by Hjelmslev's ideas about linguistic theory and almost nobody, I think, follows Hjelmslev with respect to his way of doing linguistic description.

A. Martinet:

Just impossible.

M.A.K. Halliday:

That last point is not easy, as those who have tried it know. I wonder whether we might find that we also share a commitment to linguistics as being essentially the study of meaning, which is what Firth always said it was, and Whorf, and others—a goal which was regrettably lost sight of at times. And if this is so, I notice that few of us—I may have been the only one, though I may be wrong here—few of us actually use the term "semantics" in characterizing what we're doing, and I think there may be reasons for this: it has been made to mean so many different things, and also it has been relatively less well-developed as part of a coherent theory of language than other components—which is not to say that there is not a great deal of important work in this field, and I think today we are in a period when we can say that semantics has, so to
speak, been brought into integrated models of language in various ways. Now, the context for this, as I see it today, is the renewed interest in semiotics, that is to say the study of meaning systems in general, of which language is only a special case. Would I be right in thinking that this too represents an interest which we - all of us here - share?

K.L. Pike:

I'd be a little bit careful until I knew just how you're defining meaning. Let me give the reason for this. Many people mean "meaning" as an abstraction: then my answer would be "no", because I'm unable to operate without keeping form and meaning in a constant composite. And if I tried to abstract meaning from concrete form, I end up with nothing, or with an attempt to get - like the generative semanticist - with a prior, permanent, universal, forever meaning which has no basis of proof. So I would not be able to say that studying meaning is my prime target, if by that I take their definition of meaning, which leaves it apart from form.

If, however, we take phonology as having an impact, and hence a kind of a meaning, if we take grammar — subject, object, cause-effect, undergoer-actor — as having a kind of meaning and impact, then all of these things have meaning. So, under that definition of meaning, I would probably not object to the statement, but I'm not at all sure that you would be ready to go along with such a statement as that. I summarize it this way. Personally I am totally unable to be happy at the moment with a start which makes a sharp distinction between form and meaning so we can treat either one without the other, simultaneously, even though we give more attention to one than to the other or more attention to some part of
one than the other, but they've always got to be there - if one is in the foreground, the other has to be in the background, or I don't know how to behave.

M. Gregory:

I'd like to be able to comment on what Ken Pike has just said. I would agree with him that any discussion of meaning must be related to the discussion of form. But, I would not like to think of it as a form-meaning composite, because I think that is too limiting. It tends towards a search very often times for isomorphism. What I would see is that form and meaning are in a relation, a realizatory relationship all the time, and one has to be conducted of course in terms of the other in a realizatory relationship type of way. I avoid very often using the term "semantics" for some of the reasons that Michael Halliday might have suggested: it's used for a great many things which I don't see as being within the normal descriptive linguistic activity. Another reason goes back to Firth: Firth always said that it's all semantics in a way, his Models of Meaning paper and his Technique of Semantics paper see meaning as being distributed throughout different sets of patterns. So you can talk about phonological meaning, syntactic meaning, morphological meaning, and I, of course, would talk about semiological meaning, despite the redundancy that's implicit in that. So I think that the whole of the descriptive apparatus is semantic, more or less. Also because I'm involved in what I call communication linguistics, I'm very interested in semiotics. But again, there's a problem there. So much of current material being published in semiotics regards the sign as some type of entity or object, whereas I prefer to see it as a relation-
ship, a relation. And so I tend to back off from using the term "semiotics".

W.H. Hirtle:

With certain qualification, I can agree with the point that in studying language our concern is with studying meaning primarily. Certainly I would take meaning in a less extended sense than Firth gave it - perhaps in a more traditional sense, if you like. Secondly, I would certainly begin by studying those meanings which are related to forms, because if we don't start with what is most easily accessible, I don't think we'll get to what is less accessible. And, therefore, I would agree with Professor Pike, with this addition - that in my view when we use language, we speak in order to evoke or convey, or express meanings, not to express forms. Therefore it is meaning which is the motivation, which is if you like, what I seek as the system: the grammatical meaning would be the grammatical system lying behind a grammatical form. In that respect, some of the practitioners in the school I represent here have been criticized as practising "grammatical semantics". Now I consider that a compliment rather than a criticism. Finally, one thing that has bothered me in a number of papers that I've heard here: that sometimes the scaffolding hides the meaning in a linguistic theory. Is it terminology I'm not familiar with? Is it the diagrams I'm not familiar with? Sometimes I wonder: are we talking about meaning or are we talking about observable sequences, or whatever? At the moment, I think psychomechanics tends to limit formalization as much as possible so that we do concentrate on somehow getting at the substance - if we can call meaning a substance - the object of our analysis, rather than the means of trying to formalize it.
A. Martinet:

I would have thought that, in the linguistics we stand for, we all consider it basic that languages are different. If languages are different, they differ more in the features that have less to do with meaning than in those that have a lot to do with meaning. In other words, phonology, which has nothing whatever to do with meaning in the normal sense of the word, is very fundamental for a description of language, when we want to point out what the features of a given language are, and which are the features which oppose that language to the other languages of the world. When we are through with the presentation of the phonological pattern - a task that comes first because we want to be able to identify our significant units - what's essential is not the various morphological accidents known or presented under the term "morphology" or "morphophonemics" or, as I would put it "morphology", but the significant value of the elements we are presenting. But this doesn't imply that meaning is the ultimate aim of linguistics and linguistic description, because meaning is very close to what is not linguistic in our preoccupation, namely the experience we have to communicate. I suppose you would agree with me that our experience, when we want to communicate it, is what we would identify with semantics. We have to remember all the time that the final aim of language is communication of experience. But this doesn't mean that meaning in itself is the aim of...

M.A.K. Halliday:

Martinet has just said, and it is certainly true, that languages differ from each other far more on the expression plane than on the content...
plane; and particularly, so to speak, the "higher" strata tend to share more. I imagine he would agree with me, however, in saying that does not mean that we can set up one universal semantic system to which all languages can be related. In my view, languages do differ in important ways semantically; and this, I would say, is no less important on the diachronic dimension. I think one of the interesting aspects of the history of language is how meaning systems have changed - and I'm not now talking about traditional lexical semantics, but I mean the essential semantic systems which we are able to study today. I think I'd just like to point out that, at least in my view, I'm not quite happy with the notion of communication of experience as a definition of the intent or purpose of the speaker, and therefore I wouldn't quite accept that as being what we are trying to describe in our semantics. You see, I think we've learnt a great deal from functional theories of languages which have come initially from outside linguistics; I mean from such scholars as Karl Bühler, Bronislaw Malinowski, and others in education and other fields, who have not been looking at language as we do, as an object, but purely as an instrument - but nevertheless for their purposes have come up with very interesting functional schemata. Linguists have borrowed these: the Prague School used Bühler, Firth used Malinowski, and so on. Now I think if you look at what is common to all of these, you find that it is essentially a two-fold organization around the themes of language as action and language as reflection. We use language to act, as a mode of doing, and this is what the ethnographers like Malinowski have always stressed. We use language to think, to reflect, as a mode of thinking, and this it what the psychologists, of course, have always referred to. Now our
semantics, it seems to me, does not assign a priority among these two. It has to handle both of them, and indeed, in my view, grammar can be precisely defined as that stratum in which these meanings are mapped on the one another, so as to make it possible to produce an output. Now to that one simply has to add the third component in the semantic system, which is that first described by the Prague School under the heading of functional sentence perspective, which is the way the language, so to speak, organizes itself as a semiotic system in order to be relevant, in order to relate to its environment, both textual and situational. It is what we refer to in systemic theory as a "metafunctional hypothesis" under our terms of "ideational", "interpersonal", and "textual", which I would see as the basis of a semantic theory.

D.G. Lockwood:

On the question that Professors Halliday and Martinet have been talking about - where language differs the most - I would take the position (and I think many stratificationalists would) that where it differs the most is in what we would call grammar - morphology and syntax - most particularly in morphology, and that phonology and semology, since they border on the outside world more closely, since phonology is restricted by the common vocal apparatus and auditory apparatus that all human beings have to operate on - it's necessarily restricted by those. Semology is restricted by the common experience of people even in different cultures: we live on the same planet, we have essentially the same apparatus for perceiving the world, and so the amount of variety in those places, although certainly considerable, certainly not allowing you to set up a completely universal system.
by any means, but the greatest variety is to be found among languages in the grammar—in morphology and syntax—precisely because those are the most remote from the outside.

W.H. Hirtle:

I too wish to come back to the remark that language has as its aim the communication of experience, and I, too, like Mr. Halliday, would like to complete that. I feel that, in order to communicate experience, language must first of all permit us to "represent" it, or think it, before we can express it, or communicate it. So I feel that language is fundamentally a system of representation which will then permit us to express or communicate our experience. One other point I think might be a point of difference: I would not equate experience and semantics. I feel that our experience is outside language, and I feel that semantics, is concerned with something inside language. Now the close relationship between our experience and whatever semantics refers to in language I certainly can't deny, but I do feel that there is a limit there we must recognize.

J.W.F Mulder:

I first would like to say that I agree that I certainly would not equate experience with semantics. I agree completely. But I would like to refer to what Mr. Lockwood said. If he means what—I don't know whether you still call it the hypo-phonemic stratum—if you refer to that, I would agree, because that has to do with the possibilities of our speech-organs and, of course, that is limited. As soon as you come to a higher stratum, the phonemic stratum, then wouldn't it be the case
that, of course, there are very few possibilities there, but within these possibilities, between languages the differences may be very great? On the other hand, when you come to morphology and syntax, my experience with languages in East Asia and Southeast Asia is that there are sometimes very striking similarities in morphology and syntax between languages. Take, for instance, Korean. You can almost take away the fact that in Korean there's one more level of politeness, but otherwise you can replace every morpheme of Korean by a morpheme in Japanese, and you have a perfectly good Japanese sentence, morphologically speaking and syntactically speaking. So that it seems to me that one has to be very careful with these things. One is very surprised sometimes at what one finds. Languages that lexically bear hardly any similarity at all, as Korean and Chinese or as Tibetan and Turkish, nevertheless have sometimes very great similarities in their syntactic or morphological, or, as in the case of Korean and Japanese, in their both morphological and syntactic structure.

M. Gregory:

I'd like just to take up the point that David Lockwood made. I'm in general agreement with him except that I think that the semological statements are going to have a bulge in them before there is... the narrowing down. Syd Lamb is busy cutting out strata and... busy putting them back in, because I think that the central approach, for example, to the Nigel grammar that Bill Mann and Chris Matthiessen have been working on in Michael Halliday's grammar, is that it is a sentence grammar. If it wants to produce text, it's going to have to have a text plan. It's going to have a set of essentially semological statements which allow you to produce
text in a given generic situation. Now this I think is a very multiple area of work: there's lots of different types of texts and lots of different generic situations where we use language. That part of the semological statement I think, is going to bulge, but of course it itself can only be directed in a successful way if there is the more generalized semology which does reflect our common human experience as members of the planet. That's what we call the part of semology which is culture-conditioned and socially conditioned which produces text.

S.M. Lamb:

I would like to come back to the question that was raised by Jan Mulder about what David Lockwood said. In the first place, I would reject the example of Korean and Japanese as being cogent in this case because, first, they are genetically related and, second, there's been a great deal of contact between them. Now I would also like to question part of what David Lockwood said because, if we agree with him that the part which is most interior, looking at it from a cognitive point of view, is the part where we are likely to find the greatest variation from one people to another, that seems quite reasonable. But it might be that the part which is most interior is the conceptual stratum, rather than the lexical-grammatical, because it is separated from the outside world by the various perceptual and motor system, and there—that is, in the conceptual stratum—we do seem to find a great deal of difference among different peoples of the world, different ways of conceiving how the world is put together and organized, and so on, different world views—the kind of stuff that Whorf talked about.
K.L. Pike:

I would like to point out that if one says that language is for passing on experience, and if one adds "and only that", which was not given by people who mentioned it, I would have a very strong objection because I would say that one of the crucial factors of language is that it creates experience before it passes it on. Specifically, for example, take a poem. I've been reading about poets recently and what they've done in revising their poems and how they got started. They get started and then the thing grows on them; and it was not there to begin with to be passed on - it was created at some point. It also seems to me that in physics - though I'm not a physicist, I read about the physicists - part of the working is through language (there's no other way that I know to do anything very important in physics). And so you're creating a system in language, through language and by language, and then passing it on through language. The deepest problem is here; then, I would feel it very important that we - that I, at least, - not adopt a philosophical point of view which separates the mind from the object too strongly, and treats language as an object to be studied, but ties subject and object together, so that they're working together, going together, operating together. I would just like to put in this caution, lest we overstate a case of something which is good but don't leave room for this creative component.

A. Martinet:

We rarely mention the mind, the mental aspect of things - although we know it's there, implied in about everything we say about language - because we are bound to approach the problem through
what is manifest, namely speech. And this we have to reckon with. In other words, when we make pronouncements about the structure of a language, we are pretty sure that at the back of what we present in our very formalized statements, there is some mental activity. The fact that a number of us refrain from referring to that is just due to the fact that we have no way of presenting it scientifically with a measure of acceptability for other people with whom we co-operate. We all agree that there is a mental background to what we do and say. Now, just a few words about the respective position of phonology, grammar, and lexicon. It is a fact that the lexicon is meant to cover the whole of our experience, that is, the whole world for us. And, therefore, it cannot be formalized the way the rest of the pattern can. In phonology and grammar, we operate with elements which we can posit as discrete — largely formalized elements. This is not the case with lexical items, because every one of them must be used in reference to things for which it hasn't been used yet, just because there is a limited number of monemes at our disposal. Polysemy is a fundamental necessity of linguistic expression. And that's the reason why it took so long for linguists intent upon a scientific approach to tackle the problem of semantics. It is practically impossible to give a total and final picture of the semantics of a language.

W.H. Hirtle:

I did want to say a word on Professor Pike's remark about the creativity of language, which brings into question the relationship between language and mind. It is, of course, very much a concern in our approach to language, and we generally take the attitude that the mind created language.
and is itself created by language. There is a double relationship here. A second rapid point: this possibility of polysemy which Professor Martinet has just mentioned, I think, is in direct line with this creativity aspect of language. Every word we possess is, in my opinion, a potential, and the individual speaker who is particularly imaginative can push this potential a little further, and over the generations we do get this creativity, the mind exercising language and language sending it back into the mind.

Conrad Bureau:

I want to thank you all and say, as a conclusion, that for me and the other people here... this was the best "course in linguistics" we ever had.