CORRECTIONS IMPORTANTES
à propos du texte suivant:

LANGUAGE, LINGUISTICS AND LINGUISTS;
A PANEL DISCUSSION WITH:

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M.A.K. HALLIDAY
Walter H. HIRTL
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presented by:

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Pour des raisons incontrôlables, la révision des textes de Jan W.F. Mulder et de Kenneth L. Pike nous est parvenue au moment de l'impression de la revue.

De plus, cette révision, réalisée par les auteurs eux-mêmes, a fait apparaître certaines erreurs de transcription, notamment dans le cas de Jan W.F. Mulder. Afin de rendre justice à ces deux auteurs, nous avons cru nécessaire d'apporter les corrections qu'on trouvera dans les pages suivantes. Avec nos excuses auprès des professeurs Mulder et Pike, et auprès de nos lecteurs et lectrices.

Le Comité.
Page 4 (Kenneth L. Pike):

The phonological hierarchy - for a long time I've had syllable and stress group (this was before my American colleagues dealt with anything beyond the phoneme much). But in each of those there's structure, and substantial structure, and each of those has meaning, because it has impact. Voice quality, for example, would have impact, intonation would have impact, and rhyme in poetry has impact. The grammar also would have hierarchy at each level and the grammar would go from the morpheme structure, through word structure, up to the structure of sentences, up to monologues, discourse, conversation, and all kind of texts and interlocking discussions with people.

Pages 9 à 11 (Jan W.F. Mulder):

My theory has, in first instance, three sub-theories - an ontology, called "signum theory", systemology and semantics - which are autonomous but inter-related areas. We need an ontology, because in the systemology, we speak about linguistic items; and so we do in semantics; we, therefore, need a sub-theory in which, pretty clearly, the nature of these items is indicated and that's the ontology, which I call the signum theory. I don't call it the sign theory because symbols are as much in it as what we call linguistic signs. The systemology - that is, the sub-theory where we deal with the way items are used within the system, derived first into phonology and grammar in a fairly traditional manner. Within phonology, we make a distinction between phonetics and phonotactics. The higher level of unit in phonematics is that of the phoneme; below that is the distinctive feature. The second level is the phonotactics, in which we have ordering relations between the phonemes, phonemes can be combined together (with ordering relations) into phonotagms. And then we recognize a third level, which I call para-phonotactics. At that level, we deal with phonotagms in combination with tone, accent, juncture, and so on. If we talk about a semiotic system in general, I would call these levels cemematics, cenotactics and para-cenotactics, but I shall refer here to language in the first place. In para-phonotactics we have certain units that get, as it were, a new identity by having certain features added to them, like tone in Chinese, for instance, and things in English like the difference between contrast and contrast. So that's the para-phonotactics side. Parallel to that, we have grammar, which we
could also call the plerological system. We have the cenological system, or phonological system, and
the plerological system. Grammar is just another
name for the latter. Within grammar we have pler-
omatics, plerotactics and para-plerotactics, but in
order to be able to talk with people from other
schools of linguistics, we call pleromatics usually
"morphology" (in the American sense, actually) and
we call plerotactics "syntax" (in the American
sense). Now the difference between morphology and
syntax is, in practice, very near to what Professor
Pike said already: morphology is at the level of
words. But we insist on defining things precisely:
we don't use the term "word" - we use the term
"plereme" roughly for what others call "word", also
because in the case of, for instance, the King's
Hat, here, in King's, we would recognize
two pleremes, whereas it almost looks as if
King's were one word. On the other hand, if one
has in German Sie geht die Treppe auf, geht auf
would still be one unit. I think I'm nearer to the
stratificationalists in that respect. On the basis of
there not being, functionaly speaking, ordering
relations between the components, just as in
phonology there are no - functionaly speaking
-ordering relations between the components within a
phoneme, we distinguish between morphology and
syntax. In syntax we have the things together which
are at least capable of standing in ordering rela-
tions with one another. In morphology, though there
may be sequential order, there are - functionaly
speaking - no ordering relations. Now the third
level - and that is very important, because here we
differ from most people - the third level, the para-
syntactic level, or para- plerotactic level, in
practice - not completely, but in practice almost
the same as the "sentential" level, is absolutely
distinct from the syntactic level in our theory. I
do not recognize a hierarchy throughout, from
sentence, clause, syntagm, word, etc., etc., but
several hierarchies. For instance in the plero-
matics, that is, in the morphology, we have plereme
and moneme, in the sense that Martinet uses the
term. In syntax, or plerotactics, it is syntagm
(but of course a syntagm can itself be analyzed into
syntagms: sometimes, it can be very complex - we
have, of course, a terminology for dealing with all
these things, but it would go too far to talk about
that here) and ultimately pleremes (plereme is the
lowest entity at the syntactic level but the highest
at the morphological level); and then we have on the
sentential level, where "intonation" plays a role,
the hierarchy from sentences to clauses. Now
clauses and sentences may correspond to syntags, or
they may not. If you have something like Voici
In the first place, I would like to add something about what Michael Halliday calls interlevels. I recognize a level of allophonics or allomorphy, and a level of allomorphy, where I describe the realizational aspects. These are realizational, not structural, levels. Coming to realization, André Martinet said it would be ridiculous to recognize ordering. That depends very much on whether one means ordering in the sense of realizational ordering, that is, linear ordering - which I do not; when I talk about ordering relations, I'm talking about relations of asymmetry in a set-theoretical sense. And that can be made as the basis, it's basically a logical notion. There's another reason why it is not all that ridiculous (even if it were not to be found in every language); I believe that we have to distinguish between theory and description. In the theory, like Hjelmslev has said, you have to find all the things that may be foreseen. For me, unlike for Hjelmslev, these are not things that one "finds" in languages but "waye" to describe languages. So a theory for me is an arbitrary instrument, arbitrary but appropriate, and the appropriateness guarantees that it is not hocus-pocus, as Householder would have called it. It still remains that it's not God's truth either. I don't think that there is such a distinction. And therefore, in a theory, you can have very well some possibility - because, it's only a possibility for the description of a feature that in some languages does not occur; it is necessary to have all the possibilities represented - so that any language can be described under such a theory.

But I always thought that Michael Halliday was a little bit more abstract than the orthodox Firthian point of view, more functionalist, if you wish. In a sense, someone has said this, it is a matter of faith. But I don't see that we cannot, by
a proper hypothetical-deductive logic, approach reality, simply by requiring very strictly that the theory one sets up, which is not an account of reality - the latter is the description - is appropriate. I honestly believe that this is a more humble point of view than the point of view that one can actually, as a human being, discover God's truth.

Page 22 (Jan W.F. Mulder):

The funny thing is I had even the term *syntagme* for something, but not in the same way as Pike has, which I discovered a bit later. I must have been influenced by all sorts of people. I got certainly very much interested in stratificational linguistics, which I taught with great pleasure, as you can see from certain - on terminologies I use, as *allophon*, *allophon* and things like *phonotactics*. But it didn't affect the theory as such. I think the theory is definitely functionalist and not Hjelmslevian, but there is a great Hjelmslevian influence, which I didn't realize until later.

Page 23 (Jan W.F. Mulder):

I'm in one respect, perhaps, closer to Hjelmslev than André Martinet is: namely the fact that "relation" figures very strongly in my theory, ...

et plus bas:

I don't agree, I believe I'm in actual fact even more realistic. Theory based, yes, but more empirically orientated.

Page 24 (Jan W.F. Mulder):

I go ultimately even deeper into reality than orthodox functionalists seem to do.

Pages 25-26 (Kenneth L. Pike):

And if I were to try to abstract meaning from concrete form, I would end up with nothing, or with an attempt to get - like the generative semantist - with an *a priori*, permanent, universal, forever meaning which has no basis of proof. So I would not be able to say that studying meaning...
is my prime target, if by that I take their definition of meaning, which leaves it apart from form. If, however, we take phonology as having an impact, and hence a kind of meaning, and if we take grammar — subject, object, cause-effect, undergoer-actor — as having a kind of meaning and hence an impact, and if we take lexicon as having a meaning and impact, all of these things have meaning. So, under that definition of meaning, I would probably not object to the statement, but I’m not at all sure that you would be ready to go along with such a statement as that. I summarize it this way: I personally am totally unable to be happy at the moment with a start which makes a sharp distinction between form and meaning so we can treat either one without the other; they’ve always got to be there. If one is in the foreground, the other has to be in the background, or I don’t know how to behave.

Page 32 (Jan W.F. Mulder):

Languages that lexically bear hardly any similarity at all, as Korean, Japanese, Tibetan, and Turkish, nevertheless have sometimes very great similarities in their syntactic or morphological, or, as in the case of Korean and Japanese, in both their morphological and syntactic structure.

Page 34 (Kenneth L. Pike):

So also it seems to me that in physics — though I’m not a physicist, I read about the physicists — part of the working is through language (there’s no other way that I know to do anything very important in physics). And so you’re creating a system in language, through language and by language, and then passing it on through language. The deepest problem is here: I would feel it very important that we — that I, at least — not adopt a philosophical point of view which separates the mind from the object too strongly, and treats language as an object to be studied. Rather we should tie subject and object together, so that they’re working together, going together, operating together. I would just like to put in this caution, lest we overstate a case of something which is good but doesn’t leave room for this creative component.